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Cultural Circuits of Climate Change in U.K. Broadsheet
Newspapers, 1985–2003
Anabela Carvalho1∗ and Jacquelin Burgess2
This article argues for a cultural perspective to be brought to bear on studies of climate
change risk perception. Developing the “circuit of culture” model, the article maintains that
the producers and consumers of media texts are jointly engaged in dynamic, meaning-making
activities that are context-specific and that change over time. A critical discourse analysis of
climate change based on a database of newspaper reports from three U.K. broadsheet papers
over the period 1985–2003 is presented. This empirical study identifies three distinct circuits
of climate change—1985–1990, 1991–1996, 1997–2003—which are characterized by different
framings of risks associated with climate change. The article concludes that there is evidence
of social learning as actors build on their experiences in relation to climate change science and
policy making. Two important factors in shaping the U.K.’s broadsheet newspapers’ discourse
on “dangerous” climate change emerge as the agency of top political figures and the dominant
ideological standpoints in different newspapers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Research interest in media processes, products,
and practices in relation to environmental issues has
grown over the last 20 years or so (Schoenfeld et al.,
1979; Lowe & Morrison, 1984; Burgess, 1990; Hansen,
1993; Trumbo, 1996; Mazur, 1998; Smith, 2000) with
peaks and troughs in its academic trajectory that mir-
ror those of media coverage of environmental issues.
By translating scientific knowledge into the idiom of
popular discourse and amplifying risk claims, the me-
dia are key actors in public perceptions of risk (Allan
et al., 2000). Citizens’ awareness, attitudes, and actions
toward risk are shaped, to an extent that is a matter
of academic debate, by mediated information and in-
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terpretations of risk (Fischhoff, 1995; Slovic, 2000).
While the media may shape public risk perceptions,
they also articulate public opinion and thereby play an
important role in policy making, especially in science-
related matters (Nelkin, 1987).
Academic research on media coverage of risk
emphasizes problems of inaccuracy, bias, and sen-
sationalism in reports, advocating a style of risk re-
porting that offers detailed contextual information,
such as explanations of uncertainty, the statistics of
risk, and economic factors (Singer, 1990; Bell, 1994;
Allan, 2002). However, as other studies show, the
professional culture of journalism has a significant
impact on risk reporting. For example, Wilkins and
Patterson (1990) demonstrate the impact of typical
traits of newsmaking, such as event-orientation and
the dependence on official sources, in the coverage
of the greenhouse effect while Boykoff and Boykoff
(2004) highlight the distortion of scientific knowledge
in the U.S. prestige press due to the journalistic norm
of “balance.” While acknowledging contributions by
McComas and Shanahan (1999) and Zehr (2000),
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we believe the role of media discourse in the repro-
duction and transformation of scientific and political
claims in relation to dangerous climate change merits
more attention.
In this article we first outline the elements of a
cultural-political theoretical approach to understand-
ing the production and consumption of media repre-
sentations of climate change, before turning to an in-
depth case study based on analysis of 19 years’ cover-
age of climate change in a sample of the U.K.’s broad-
sheet newspapers (Carvalho, 2002, 2005). The article
will argue that the mass media play a central role in the
social construction of risk. Different social actors (sci-
entists, politicians, policymakers, businesses, pressure
groups, and media professionals) are locked in discur-
sive competition around how climate change risk is to
be framed in the media. Our critical discourse anal-
ysis (CDA) reveals that political actors have played
by far the most powerful and effective role in shap-
ing climate change in the public sphere over the last
20 years, but their framings have always been medi-
ated through each newspaper’s preferred ideological
worldview.
2. UNDERSTANDING MEDIA
CONSTRUCTIONS OF RISK: MODELING
CIRCUITS OF CULTURE
Although media studies have largely rejected
a linear, transmission “cause-effect” model of mass
communications—in which (dominant) producers
transmit messages across space and through time
to (subordinate, passive) receivers—the “informa-
tion model” has remained an influential framework
in studies of science communication. The approach
can be seen to underpin “the canonical view,” which
typically conceptualizes science communication as
“popularization” of learned academic findings for lay
members of the public (Bucchi, 1998; Allan, 2002).
How does a cultural-political perspective differ? By
offering an alternative conceptual framework that
recognizes the profound significance of mass media
in contemporary life. Traditional print and broad-
cast media, embracing new information and commu-
nication technologies, play a central cultural role in
modernity through the selective provision of social
knowledge, including that of science and technology;
attempts to forge consensus about the natural order
of events and actions, including risk, through contin-
ual redefinitions of reality; and a continuing strug-
gle for legitimacy between differentially empowered
groups through discursive means (Hall, 1977, 1980;
Fairclough, 1995; Curran & Gurevitch, 2000). As the
seminal book by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) re-
minds readers, different cultural perspectives arising
from different forms of social relations play a funda-
mental role in constructing risks as well as the proce-
dural rationalities through which those risks are ad-
dressed (Dake, 1992; Adams, 1995). But in the em-
phasis on typologies of risk in culture theory, equally
important questions about how risks are constructed
within different systems of signification have often
been submerged. One valuable contribution made by
Beck (1992), for example, was to emphasize the power
of media communications in shaping cultural politics
in the era of “global mega-hazards” such as climate
change.
In British cultural studies it is possible to find a
conceptual framework for studying social construc-
tions of risk that understands culture “as a social
product with its own forms of objective existence
and its own real shapes” (Johnson, 1986, p. 282).
The model known as the circuit of culture has semi-
otic processes of “encoding” and “decoding” mean-
ings in verbal and visual texts, constrained by contex-
tual factors, at its heart. Through the application of
linguistic-, visual-, and genre-based rules, media pro-
fessionals produce texts that circulate—and help
define—the public sphere (Habermas, 1989; Hall,
1980). Audiences, through their own meaning-making
practices, decode media communications in the con-
texts of their everyday lives: “readings” that may or
may not accord with the framings offered by the me-
dia (Morley, 1986; Burgess et al., 1991). In its origi-
nal formulation, the circuit of culture is not able to
address issues of reflexivity: over time, political and
economic contexts change as do scientific knowledge
claims and popular understanding of what constitute
environmental risks. Fig. 1 represents our adaptation
of the model to allow for analysis of media construc-
tions of risk through time.
The model distinguishes between three key “mo-
ments” that fold into one another: production,
textual analysis, and consumption, leading to new mo-
ments of production. Taking production first, groups
of media professionals work in contexts structured
by institutional, economic, political, and technolog-
ical demands to produce stories from source mate-
rials that will define the day’s news. Depicting the
environment posits various challenges for media pro-
fessionals (Wilkins & Patterson, 1990; Hansen, 1993;
Bell, 1994; Anderson, 1997; Smith, 2000). Time-scales,
spatial categories, and causal links in issues such as
climate change are not immediately compatible with
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Fig. 1. A diachronic model of circuits of culture (developed from Johnson, 1986; see Du Gay, 1997 for different formulation).
conventional news values, such as novelty, recency,
and factuality. The complex and “diffuse” nature of
the problem leaves scope for media sources to have
a very influential role in shaping media agendas and
discourses on this issue (see Gandy, 1982). The media
apply a number of standard principles, procedures,
and routines (Gandy, 1979) both to the initial selec-
tion of events that will become “news,” and to “en-
code” the source material. Of particular importance,
the producers have a strong sense of their putative
audience, and how the story should be told.
The second moment identified in the circuit is the
public dissemination of encoded messages either as
nonmaterial electronic broadcasts on television, ra-
dio, or the internet, or as material printed newspa-
pers, magazines, and so forth. The texts for analysis
thus include linguistic, aural, and visual communica-
tions, enabling analysts to deconstruct the discursive
rules in play (Burgess, 1985, 1990; Myerson & Rydin,
1996; van Leeuwen & Jewitt, 2001) and their rhetor-
ical functions such as how linguistic texts and visual
images seek to persuade audiences of their facticity or
truthfulness (van Dijk, 1988; Fairclough, 1995). Pro-
ducers endeavor through the rhetoric of their verbal
and visual communications to position readers and
viewers so that they interpret texts in the ways in-
tended, and clearly there are asymmetries in terms
of the power that encoders can exercise in framing
knowledge claims and what significance they might
have. However, as the corpus of qualitative research
with audiences (the third moment) who consume
media products shows, readers also have power
in resisting or subverting preferred interpretations
(Myers & Macnaghten, 1998; Corner, 2000). Mean-
ings are remade in the contexts of social interac-
tion at the local level as media texts are reembed-
ded in daily life. While this argument holds for a wide
range of cultural products, there are particular issues
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associated with complex scientific knowledge claims
and the competencies of audiences to engage critically
with such discourses (Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Ungar,
2000), which may well, for specific policy purposes,
require more structured processes of social interac-
tion between lay and specialist audiences to provide
spaces for deliberation (Burgess et al., in press).
Audiences for media products are not only
socioeconomically but also culturally differenti-
ated (Bourdieu, 1984). Specialists, including climate
change scientists and media workers, are also poten-
tially powerful audiences—powerful in the sense that
they do have the capacity to help shape new phases
of production. New strategies emerge such as evolv-
ing editorial stances in relation to the issue; new re-
search grants because of the high profile of certain
research teams in the media; new opportunities to
construct a public relations campaign; new pres-
sures for more or less regulation to encourage
eco-efficiencies; new ways of making scientific pub-
lications more “media friendly,” and so on. In the
biography of climate change risks, some of these “me-
diatization” strategies are now clearly visible such as
changing relations between scientists, policymakers,
and journalists (Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995; Weingart
et al., 2000). By studying representations of climate
change diachronically, it becomes possible to identify
some of these influential relationships.
3. RESEARCHING CULTURAL CIRCUITS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Conducting empirical research that attempts to
hold the whole circuit together through longitudinal
research with journalists and their sources, quantita-
tive and discursive textual analyses on the multiplic-
ity of print and broadcast texts in circulation over the
same time-scale, and ethnographic research with dif-
ferent audiences is extremely challenging (Burgess &
Harrison, 1993) although vital if social constructions
of risk are to be properly understood. In the case study
presented here, emphasis is given to a detailed dis-
course analysis of media texts but over a substantial
length of time, enabling us to identify three phases
of development in the cultural construction of cli-
mate change risks. A few contemporaneous studies
with U.K. producers (Chapman et al., 1997; Ander-
son, 1997; Smith, 2000) and audiences (Harrison et al.,
1996; Hinchliffe, 1996; Myers & Macnaghten, 1998)
do exist but, frustratingly, are not directly comparable
with the work presented here.
Newspaper production and consumption in the
United Kingdom are polarized: at the national level,
there are a small number of what were known until
recently as “broadsheet” or “quality” newspapers
characterized by extensive political and economic
comment, which have relatively small but well-
educated and influential readerships (The Times, The
Guardian, The Independent, Daily Telegraph, Finan-
cial Times, and weekend stable-mates). The remain-
ing newspapers are often labeled “red-tops” with a
more populist orientation including greater empha-
sis on crime, sex, and celebrity (Daily Mail, Daily
Express, Daily Mirror, Sun). The analysis presented
here focuses on The Guardian (and the Sunday broad-
sheet The Observer), The Independent (including The
Independent on Sunday), and The Times (including
the Sunday Times). The choice of newspapers results
from interest in examining, as fully as possible, devel-
opments in the arguments and perspectives of various
social actors on climate change. Debate is excessively
simplified or excluded in other media. Furthermore,
the selected newspapers have an important power of
“agenda-setting” for decisionmakers, politicians, the
public, and the other media in the United Kingdom
(Sparks, 1987). These newspapers span over the po-
litical spectrum and were selected to represent differ-
ent editorial positions: The Guardian is owned by a
charitable trust, represents liberal, social democratic
politics, and has long played an active role in covering
environmental issues; The Times has a conservative,
right-of-center editorial policy committed to the “es-
tablishment” and the sovereignty of traditional insti-
tutions. Finally, The Independent is a new broadsheet
paper established in 1986 without any declared party-
political line.
The main questions we want to address are the
following: How has the press represented risk asso-
ciated with climate change in the last two decades?
How have the claims and views of different social
actors been reconstructed in newspapers? In what
ways do media texts relate to the wider sociopolit-
ical context in which they are produced and con-
sumed? CDA provides the theoretical and method-
ological approach to examine these issues. The cir-
cuit of culture concept offers a general framework for
the social construction and reconstruction of reality;
CDA offers in turn specific analytical tools for the
deconstruction of meanings. A concern with the sig-
nificance of language practices, especially verbal ones,
in the construction of meaning is common to the many
strands of discourse analysis (see Schiffrin, 1994).
Distinctively, CDA links language use to the
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particular social and political contexts in which it takes
place (e.g., Fairclough, 1995; van Dijk, 1988; Wodak
et al., 1999). Discourse is viewed as a form of social
practice and each discursive event is both influenced
by social life and constitutive of new forms of thinking
and relating to the social world. Instead of analyzing
texts per se, CDA attempts to understand the links be-
tween texts and social relations, distribution of power,
and dominant values and ideas. As we have argued,
media texts encapsulate the social contexts in which
they are produced and shape people’s readings of and
acting upon the world. This, in turn, motivates a new
cycle of production of texts.
The analytical framework used here addressed
both texts and contexts. At the textual level, the fol-
lowing issues were considered: morphological char-
acteristics (i.e., related to form or position—size of
the article, position, section) and structural organiza-
tion of texts (what is chosen for the headline and the
first few paragraphs, what is left for the end of the
text); objects (themes) and actors represented in the
text; linguistic and rhetorical issues (lexical choices,
metaphors, and other figures of speech); discursive
strategies (strategies of discursive “manipulation” of
reality in order to achieve a certain goal or effect); and
ideological standpoints (the ideas, values, and world-
views associated with particular forms of “talking”
about reality). Discursive strategies and ideological
standpoints can be inferred from the analysis of the
other elements and their interaction in the construc-
tion of particular meanings. By looking at how a par-
ticular choice of words, for instance, is recurrently as-
sociated with a certain social actor we can start to
identify the discursive strategy of the “speaker” with
regard to that actor (e.g., legitimation of a given ac-
tion or discrediting). More generally, we have to pay
attention to the overall meaning effect created in the
text in relation to an issue or actor. Obviously, dis-
cussing all these issues in detail for all the articles that
were analyzed is not viable within the limits of this
article.
Contexts were addressed both through reference
to key events in climate change science and policy over
the period, as well as a more general review of chang-
ing economic, political, and social events in the United
Kingdom over the period. The contextual analysis
runs along two axes: comparative-synchronic (simul-
taneous depictions of the issue in different newspa-
pers) and historical-diachronic (temporal sequences
and evolutions).
CDA is essentially an interpretive work. Logic
and credibility of argumentation, backed up by quotes
from the texts, are the main “validity” tests in this kind
of analysis (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Potter, 2003).
4. CONSTRUCTING DANGEROUS
CLIMATE CHANGE
The set of press articles to be analyzed was
put together with the results of keyword searches
on the newspapers’ CD-ROMs, and the FT-Profile
and Lexis-Nexis databases for the period January 1,
1985 to December 31, 2003. The keywords were cli-
mate change OR global warming OR greenhouse ef-
fect. Given that search results included many articles
where climate change was merely referred to in pass-
ing, the initial database was narrowed down to those
articles where it was the core (or associated with the
core) theme. This required a scan-type reading of all
the texts to select those where climate change was
mentioned in the headline; references to the topic
filled a significant part of the article; climate change
was presented as the cause of the central theme (such
as an extreme weather event); or “solutions” for it
were discussed.3 A total of 5,910 articles met at least
one of these conditions. Fig. 2 shows their distribution
in time.
The volume of press coverage provides an im-
portant indication of the attention given to an issue
over time. Fig. 2 shows three main phases to date:
1985–1990, when media attention to climate change
rises significantly; 1991–1996, a period of recession
in the volume of coverage; and 1997–2003, a second
sharp rise (although marked by some fluctuation).
This division into three main periods is also sustained
by discourse analysis of news articles, which showed,
as discussed below, that important modifications in
the meanings associated with climate change also oc-
curred in those segments of time.
All the articles published between 1985 and
early 1989 were subjected to a detailed discourse
analysis. From January 1989, a process of discur-
sive “sedimentation” was detectable, as various dis-
cursive strategies and standpoints started to appear
recurrently in press reports. From this period, the
analysis was focused on critical discourse moments
(Chilton, 1987; Gamson, 1992), marked by relevant
events related, for instance, to political or scientific
activity, such as international summits or the launch
3 For the period 2001–2003, instead of doing this type of selection,
figures of “core” articles have been calculated from the initial key-
word search results based on the percentage of articles selected
in the previous periods.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of newspaper articles
on climate change: 1985–2003.
of reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC). These critical moments en-
tail a potential for transformation in understand-
ings of a problematique and constitute a test for
“established” discursive positions. Therefore, it is
important to examine whether and how represen-
tations of the greenhouse effect changed or re-
mained static in these moments, which are pointed out
below.
4.1. 1985–1990: From Silence to the Political
Construction of Risk
Between 1985 and 1990 the discursive construc-
tion of climate change in the British press underwent
an important transformation as the early definitional
power of scientists was usurped by the direct inter-
vention of the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret
Thatcher, in the debate, toward the end of 1988. Be-
tween 1985 and 1988, The Guardian and The Times
depicted scientific knowledge on the enhanced green-
house effect as consensual and reliable, relying on
scientists and mainstream science journals as major
sources. Given news preferences for a novel news sub-
ject and to meet the need for clarity and lack of am-
biguity, the scientific claims were simplified to be un-
derstood by a general audience and “strengthened”
to fit the media’s rhetorical purposes. Scientists were
the exclusive definers of the issue for the press but
their capacity to influence the media agenda—and
therefore the public and political agendas—remained
very limited as suggested by the number of news
articles. While early press representations of cli-
mate change exhibited a strong degree of confi-
dence in the forecasts of a “major global warming”
they did not show any traits of catastrophism (cf.
Weingart et al., 2000). Rather, the press clearly un-
derestimated the risks associated with climate change,
and refrained from presenting its possible conse-
quences. In a similar vein, newspapers remained
silent about responsibility for the problem, not only
leaving unquestioned the economic and social prac-
tices that generate greenhouse gases (GHGs) but
also omitting references to the role of political
institutions.
The turning point in media discourse on climate
change was Mrs. Thatcher’s speech to the Royal So-
ciety on September 27, 1988 when she stated that:
“It is possible that . . . we have unwittingly begun a
massive experiment with the system of the planet it-
self.” The impact of her intervention has been widely
commented upon and the sharp rise in the volume of
subsequent press coverage on the greenhouse effect
clearly indicates the weight of political leadership in
the definition of risks. After Thatcher’s speech, cli-
mate change was often narrativized as a major risk
for human security. Stronger scientific claims were
amplified; for the first time, scenarios of impacts
were brought forward. The Independent, which had
remained largely silent about the problem, started
magnifying it. On October 17, 1988, for example, a
front-page headline announced that the “Met Office
predicts global-scale floods.” A temperature rise of
5.2◦C was forecast for the following 50–100 years, a
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much higher estimate than those of most scientists at
the time. The Times also presented global warming as
a substantial danger at the end of 1988. The strategy
of dramatization of the problem is clear in headlines
like “Upheaval to climate ‘imminent’”4 or “Can we
stop Britain drowning,”5 and in a significant number
of other articles.
As the range of political measures, economic
transformation, and lifestyle adaptations necessary to
address climate change became evident, The Times
shifted to a more skeptical position. Skepticism in re-
lation to scientific claims on climate change was pro-
moted by emphasizing the lack of evidence and the
exaggeration of the problem by the other media. In
“The final forecast?; The world’s weather,” Brian
James (November 11, 1988) maintained that “when
challenged by the decision-makers . . . the climatol-
ogists lack all proof.” From a different ideological
stance, The Guardian maintained its emphasis on the
risk associated with climate change. Its science corre-
spondent Tim Radford was highly critical of govern-
ment announcements such as the proposal by Mrs.
Thatcher and her Environment Secretary Nicholas
Ridley that nuclear power was a good option to ad-
dress the greenhouse effect.6 In The Independent
some authors appeared to align with the government’s
discursive construction of climate change but others
showed a more critical attitude. The Independent’s
science correspondent, Nicholas Schoon, for exam-
ple, reported on the views of “experts” to counteract
Thatcher’s and Ridley’s strong promotion of nuclear
energy as a means of decreasing GHG emissions.7
Interestingly, the debate on whether nuclear power
should be promoted reignited in the U.K. press in
the summer of 2004—led by The Independent—as the
risks of an “energy-crunch” grew more substantial.
The social construction of risk acquired new
agents from among the elite audiences of the media
at this time. As climate change gained political signif-
icance, various political actors attempted to interpret
scientific claims and use different studies to promote
different arguments and agendas. In 1989–1990, Mrs.
Thatcher continued to shape the public construction
of risk associated with climate change. Her speech
at the United Nations (November 8, 1989) framed
global environmental change into the main risk
4 Robert Mathews, November 14, 1988.
5 Peter Davenport and John Young, October 21, 1988.
6 “The edge of darkness,” November 2, 1988; “The dread and the
green,” November 22, 1988.
7 “Experts see better ways to counter global warming,” Nicholas
Schoon, November 7, 1988.
facing humanity: “It is life itself that we must battle
to preserve”; “The challenge for our negotiators is as
great as for any disarmament treaty.”8 Her rhetorical
strategy may be described as “securitization” (Wæver,
1995), representing climate change risks as “an exis-
tential threat” to the future of the planet (Stripple,
2000, p. 2). The ideological lines were drawn between
a neo-liberal politics, which framed climate change as
a global threat that required every country to share
the burden, and a more radical politics, which argued
that mitigation/adaptation costs should be borne by
the industrialized nations most responsible for the
production of GHGs.
Another critical moment was the public presenta-
tion of the first IPCC science report on May 25, 1990.
Noncoincidently, Mrs. Thatcher opened the Hadley
Centre for Climate Prediction and Research and an-
nounced the British target for GHG emissions on the
same day. In both The Independent and The Guardian,
the IPCC report was an opportunity to emphasize a
sense of danger, with headlines such as: “The green-
house time bomb: Authors of UN report say new data
shows they have underestimated dangers of global
warming.”9 A precautionary approach was advocated
in both newspapers, but The Guardian had a more po-
litically motivated approach to climate change, regu-
larly criticizing official positions or policies.
Reflecting a very different ideological position,
the Sunday Times carried a series of articles stim-
ulated by the publication of the IPCC report that
crudely scorned environmental concern and dis-
missed the problem of climate change: “Green hys-
teria sets red alarm bells ringing”; “Global Fawning.
Global Warming” (May 27, 1990); and two editorials
entitled “Greenhousemongers” (May 27, 1990) and
Greenhousemongers 2 (June 3, 1990). A rhetorical
strategy of de-legitimating unwelcome scientific or
political knowledge claims by discrediting the agents
of such claims was common in The Times’ cover-
age: “sentimental ululation,” “mysticism,” and “green
Stalinism” are some of the labels employed by The
Times about “environmentalists” and “environmen-
talism,” categories that appear to subsume every-
one from scientists to environmental NGOs. The
newspaper’s loyalty to the Conservative government,
which was pushing an image of danger associated
with climate change to create “discursive space” for
advancing particular policies, was in tension with The
8 “Thatcher in call to save environment,” Martin Walker, The
Guardian, November 9, 1989.
9 Steve Connor, May 27, 1990, The Independent.
1464 Carvalho and Burgess
Times’ allegiance to values of individual freedom, free
market, and the preservation of the status quo. In
this period, the paper’s core values were dominant
in its discourse. It was prominent in reporting the U.S.
climate change “backlash,” financed by business and
pursued in conservative think-tanks, and giving voice
to the powerful self-promotion activities of the “skep-
tical” scientists.
Between 1985 and 1990, climate change scientists
first gained and then lost definitional control of what
climate change was and what it meant for the world.
Similar findings have been reported in the United
States (Trumbo, 1996) and Germany (Weingart et al.,
2000). British media only took a “Cassandra role”
(Weingart et al., 2000) after the enhanced greenhouse
effect was embraced by the Prime Minister: the dis-
cursive construction of climate change into a public
risk was clearly tied to the government’s initiative to
situate that risk within a neo-liberal economic pro-
gram, sharing the costs globally while reaping poten-
tial economic benefits nationally. This framing served
to highlight profound ideological differences between
the three broadsheet newspapers’ representations of
scientific knowledge claims: discourses were trans-
formed as scientific uncertainty was used to sustain
different value-based positions with regard to what
should be done.
4.2. 1991–1996: Climate Change Recedes
in the Public Sphere
As shown by Fig. 2, U.K. national press cover-
age of climate change declined sharply in 1991. De-
spite small recoveries in 1992 (Rio Earth Summit) and
1995 (1st Conference of the Parties for the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)—COP-1), levels of attention remained
low until 1997. Thus, there is little correspondence be-
tween scientific knowledge of climate change risk and
media understanding of that risk: levels of GHGs con-
tinued to rise and the 1995 IPPC report strengthened
risk claims in relation to anthropogenic impacts on the
climate. Several factors may explain why, from 1991,
the British press’s representations of risk associated
with climate change faded away: following extremely
high levels of coverage of environmental issues in
the late 1980s, editorial “fatigue” set in, not least be-
cause no “climate catastrophe” occurred and it be-
came difficult to sustain a “dramatic” risk storyline
(see Ungar, 1992, 1995; McComas & Shanahan, 1999
for similar findings in the U.S. press); a lower political
profile of the environment (e.g., there were no
significant public pronouncements by political lead-
ers on climate change in 1991); the onset of economic
recession in the United Kingdom meant a loss of ad-
vertising revenue for newspapers and a general po-
litical downgrading of the environment in relation
to other more traditional economic and social con-
cerns; and the realization of the “cost of significant
progress” (Downs, 1972). The UNFCCC was signed at
Rio in 1992 but generated little sustained press cover-
age over the next three years. In the public sphere, the
dangers posed by climate change effectively “disap-
peared.” Quantitative surveys of U.K. public opinion
recorded a decline in importance attached to climate
change risks (Rudig, 1995) while qualitative research
revealed considerable uncertainty among members of
the public about what climate change meant, whether
it was a current or future threat to human and ecolog-
ical well-being, and how it related to the emerging
policy discourse of “sustainable development”
(Harrison et al., 1996; Hinchliffe, 1997; Macnaghten
& Jacobs, 1997; Burgess et al., 1998).
In late 1995, two critical moments witnessed some
increase in coverage: COP-1 in Berlin and publication
of IPCC’s Second Assessment Report. The IPCC’s re-
port (IPCC, 1996)10 clearly stated for the first time
that human activities have an impact on climate: “the
balance of evidence suggests a discernible human in-
fluence on global climate.” The report also called for
stricter mitigation measures for GHG emissions. Re-
constructions of scientific claims in the press in this pe-
riod varied considerably and the role of the different
ideologies espoused by news professionals was clear.
While The Guardian11 and The Independent12 ampli-
fied the risks and mobilized public concern about cli-
mate change, The Times attempted to discredit the
IPCC.13 Again, reflecting different ideological posi-
tions in relation to the issue, interpretative differences
can be detected in newspapers’ expectations and eval-
uations of COP-1, whose purpose was to strengthen
the goals set up by the UNFCCC. The Guardian, and
to a lesser degree The Independent, attempted to keep
climate change risk on the public agenda. The Times
sought to persuade its readers that climate change
did not pose any significant risk to society. For exam-
ple, several articles clearly demonstrate what Dryzek
(1997) calls a “Promethean Discourse,” conceiving
10 The report was released at the end of 1995 and published in 1996.
11 For example, “Climate: A race against time,” Paul Brown, De-
cember 5, 1995.
12 For example, “Global warming is here, experts agree,” Nicholas
Schoon, p. 3, November 30, 1995.
13 “The heat of argument,” Nigel Hawkes, October 30, 1995.
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no limits to the exploitation of nature for material
development and economic growth.14 This ideologi-
cal standpoint was also present in The Independent,
often coupled with a neo-liberal position.15 As op-
position to state regulation led some to deny the
risks involved in climate change, other authors in
The Independent amplified those risks and raised
concern.16
The discursive strategy of simply denying the risk
was challenged by the first appearance of an im-
portant commercial actor as the global insurance in-
dustry publicly supported the climate science-policy
community. Threatened by very large losses result-
ing from climate-change-related events, the insur-
ance industry demanded political commitment to a
precautionary approach. By framing the problem in
financial terms, insurers eased access to some con-
servative fora, like The Times.17 The industry’s in-
tervention demonstrated division among powerful
business interests in relation to climate change and
therefore helped to redefine the economic stakes of
the issue. As Greenpeace entered a “discourse coali-
tion” (Hajer, 1995) with the insurance industry it also
advanced its own agenda (Leggett, 2000), adjusted to
resonate with other publics.
In this second circuit, there are therefore some
observable differences in the discursive construction
of climate change. Partly such changes may be ex-
plained by editorial demands for a new angle (Downs,
1972; Gans, 1979) but it is also evident that journal-
ists were learning from their ongoing engagement
with climate change scientists and policymakers. En-
vironment correspondents such as Nicholas Schoon
(The Independent), Paul Brown18 (The Guardian),
and Nick Nuttal (The Times) had been covering cli-
mate change since the late 1980s, experiences re-
flected in their framing of many stories at this time.
There is a discernible shift from asking basic ques-
tions about the science to exposing the political games
and pressures that may shape the outcomes of the sci-
14 “Save the world: vote for an econut,” Norman Macrae, Sunday
Times, April 2, 1995; “Beware of the greens who cry wolf,” Matt
Ridley, March 25, 1995.
15 “Global warming won’t cost the earth,” Frances Cairncross,
March 27, 1995.
16 “Threat of global warming to grow faster,” Nicholas Schoon,
March 21, 1995; “Global warming puts Britain’s climate down the
plughole,” Geoffrey Lean, The Independent on Sunday, March
26, 1995.
17 For example, “Insurers support green reforms at Berlin summit,”
Nick Nuttall, March 27, 1995.
18 Brown (1996) subsequently published a book on climate change
science policy.
ence production process.19 Journalists used this “anti-
blackboxing” strategy as a form of reinforcing trust in
what the IPCC put forward, despite all the condition-
ing mechanisms exerted over it.
In summary, specific social, political, and eco-
nomic contexts impacted on discursive practice in the
early 1990s. As a set of circumstances constrained
the production of media representations of climate
change, and as the “consensual” discourse of “sus-
tainable development” came to be dominant in policy
circles, it seems likely that policymakers may have had
more leverage to make nonnecessary choices, which
the media sanctioned. Government opposition to the
carbon tax proposed by the European Union in 1993,
which could have had significant environmental ben-
efits, and the missed opportunities in the U.K.’s Cli-
mate Change Programme published in 1994, for ex-
ample, received very little coverage. As the interna-
tional agendas of climate change science and politics
moved forward in 1995 and as new social actors, such
as the insurance industry, actively proposed new read-
ings of climate change, media discourse also regained
some momentum.
4.3. 1997–2003: Danger Comes Close to Home
The analysis presented so far was extended to
2003 for the purposes of this article but we can only
briefly cover this most recent cultural circuit. It is
marked by a different discursive strategy in which
the dangers of climate change are being realized in
specific geographical places and events. In 1997, af-
ter nearly two decades of Conservative government,
New Labour, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, took
power. Not traditionally a political party associated
with strong environmental interests, there were never-
theless hopes that the active role played by Conserva-
tive Environment Minister John Gummer in prepar-
ing the U.K. case for Kyoto in late 1997 would be con-
tinued under New Labour. The substantial increase in
volume of press coverage (Fig. 2) marked the political
significance of Kyoto20 and increasingly explicit calls
for action by IPCC in the Third Assessment Report
(2001).
19 For example, “The right climate for tax on fuel,” October
16, 1995, and “Global warming is here, experts agree,” p. 3,
November 30, 1995, both by Nicholas Schoon, The Indepen-
dent; “World’s burning issue,” October 28, 1995, Paul Brown,
The Guardian.
20 Kyoto has also been the news peg behind dramatic rises in media
coverage in the United States (Shanahan, 2000).
1466 Carvalho and Burgess
Oppositional cultural politics—in the sense of ac-
tive conflicts between different ways of framing the
societal problems generated by climate change—were
subdued in the public sphere from 1997 to 1998.
The promise that sustainable development could be
achieved through new styles of governance where all
parties willingly negotiated for “win-win” outcomes
fitted New Labour’s larger political ideology for part-
nerships between the state, the market, and civil so-
ciety (Munton, 2003). The scope for the press to
invigilate and challenge the politics of climate change
narrowed in the immediate post-Kyoto period, before
the papers were able to identify opportunities to reas-
sume their more traditional discursive positions. From
late 1998, the press appeared to be more alert and
there was more critique of New Labour, especially
in The Guardian, which started once more to goad
national government for failing to act on environ-
mental issues, including climate change,21 while The
Times promoted business interests, privileging policy
options that served the most powerful industries.22
Representations of the climate science-policy
nexus in 1997 showed definite signs of social learning
having taken place. There was an increased tendency
for news professionals to talk about “backstage” is-
sues like the interests and commitments of actors
involved in science-making, contributing to a more
in-depth understanding of the international politics
of climate change.23 While, as argued above, this shift
may be seen as merely reflecting editorial demands for
“new angles” on climate change, there was, unusually,
an increased reflexivity in news discourse. The role of
the media in relation to the social and political sta-
tus of the environment generally, and climate change
particularly, was discussed in some articles and some
journalists openly reasoned about their own personal
commitments to the issue.24
One notable feature of more recent discourse
since 1999–2000 is a new sense of urgency attached to
risks from climate change. Rather than being repre-
sented as a remote possibility for distant “others,” the
impacts of climate change are brought into audiences’
everyday experience by news professionals report-
ing dramatic weather-related events in the discursive
21 For example, “The Thatcher legacy: Behind the mask,” John Vi-
dal and Paul Brown, September 30, 1998.
22 For example, “Levy to benefit public sector but hurt industry,”
Carl Mortished, June 30, 1999.
23 For example, “Getting warmer, but still a long way from our
goal,” Nicholas Schoon, The Independent, December 12, 1997.
24 For example, “Last night’s TV: You don’t want to do that,”
Desmond Christy, The Guardian, December 12, 1997.
frame of accelerating climate change. Two examples
of “critical discourse moments” are the severe river-
ine flooding in autumn 2000, and the 2003 heat wave
when many parts of Europe registered their highest
ever summer temperatures.25 Causal links between
these extreme “natural events” and climate change
were prominent in press reports, an interpretive ten-
dency reinforced by senior government politicians26
perhaps keen to deflect attention from other, more
immediate potential contributory factors such as inad-
equate planning controls over development in flood-
plains and changing farming practices. The Times, as
in previous years, still attempted to dismiss climate
change27 as a real risk but, given growing consen-
sus that extreme events and abrupt weather changes
could be manifestations of an increasingly unstable
global climate, was forced to moderate its tone.
Extreme natural events such as floods and heat
waves have long provided media with dramatic, news-
worthy stories. As in 1987–1988 in the United States,
when a summer heat wave stoked early greenhouse
effect stories (Ungar, 1992; Mazur, 1998), the extreme
weather events of the last few years provided an ex-
cellent hook for the new interpretive round of stories.
Amplifying the new cultural understanding that un-
usual/extreme weather events were being “caused” by
climate change were increasing numbers of climate
change scientists turning to regional assessments of
climate change impacts and the IPCC’s shift toward
emphasizing regional impacts of climate change in
its public communications strategy. Senior U.K. pol-
icy actors such as Sir John Houghton (former head
of the Meteorological Office) and Sir David King,
the Government’s Chief Scientist, made headline-
grabbing interventions by attempting discursively to
map the dangers of climate change in the issue-arena
(Hansen, 1993) of terrorism and national security. As
The Guardian reported in July 2003:
25 For example, “Global warming is now a weapon of mass destruc-
tion: It kills more people than terrorism, yet Blair and Bush do
nothing,” John Houghton, July 28, 2003; “Action stations,” John
Schellnhuber, August 6, 2003; “Extreme weather: Global warm-
ing may be speeding up, fears scientist,” John Vidal, August 6,
2003 (all articles in The Guardian); “Britain braced for a Sunday
roasting,” Robin McKie and Mark Townsend, The Observer, Au-
gust 10, 2003.
26 For example, “Weather: ‘action now essential’: Extreme events
will be the norm—Prescott,” Paul Brown, The Guardian, p. 1,
November 1, 2000.
27 For example, “Britain can cope, whatever the weather,” leading
article, October 31, 2000; “This folly of a policy is powered by
windy thinking,” Philip Stott, July 15, 2003.
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Warning voices, carrying the threat of a future dystopia,
are becoming clearer and more insistent. . . . Two weeks
ago Sir John Houghton, the former head of the Met
Office, compared climate change to a weapon of mass
destruction.28
Signaling a new interpretive strategy that may
well have important future ramifications, the risks
from accelerating climate change prompted debate
in the U.K. media about the merits of embracing
a new nuclear power program to generate elec-
tricity. Raised in The Times in summer 2003,29 the
debate grew during 2004 stimulated by The Indepen-
dent, which devoted an entire front page to James
Lovelock’s30 conclusion that nuclear energy produc-
tion was “the only green solution” able effectively
to mitigate climate change. The stage is set in the
United Kingdom for a fascinating cultural-political
struggle over the next few years between deeply en-
grained public understandings of dangerous nuclear
power and much more shallowly embedded framings
of dangerous climate change (Burgess et al., 2004).
5. CONCLUSIONS
The case study presented here is framed as a series
of cultural circuits and highlights the need for research
to address seriously the social dynamics of commu-
nicative processes in relation to present and future ac-
tions to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Risk,
as Douglas and Wildavsky argued so convincingly, is
socially constructed and as such, the mass media play
an important role in delimitating “the social limits to
curiosity” (1982, p. 102) for all the actors brought into
relationship. Research has demonstrated that media
representation is an important agenda-setting factor
for audiences in relation to “unobtrusive” issues such
as climate change and, more importantly, is a signifi-
cant influence in shaping people’s knowledge and per-
ceptions of the issue (Wilson, 1995; Krosnick et al.,
2000; Ungar, 2000; Corbett & Durfee, 2004).
This analysis of 19 years of discourse on climate
change provides insight into how cultural-political
circuits are functioning. The analysis shows that the
broadsheet print media are responsive to scientific
and social learning, to changing political agendas
and contexts, and to the communicative strategies of
28 “The climate must change: And reform must start with America,”
Leader, August 6, 2003.
29 “Nuclear power ‘is critical to Britain’s future,’ Mark Henderson,
August 18, 2003; “Making the case for nuclear power,” nonat-
tributed, August 21, 2003.
30 “James Lovelock: nuclear power is the only green solution,” The
Independent, May 24, 2004.
agencies such as IPCC, as long as those responses
complement, or can be made to complement, each
newspaper’s editorial position. Values and ideological
cultures are key to explain variations in the media’s
reinterpretations of scientific knowledge on climate
change, which in turn may either sustain or annihi-
late the space for particular options for policy making
and individual action. While some media may legiti-
mate and consolidate particular policies, others have
had a crucial role in drawing attention and building
concern for climate change, as well as in contesting po-
litical choices and showing that there are alternative
courses of action. In an early study of the U.S. press
coverage of climate change, Wilkins (1993) found that
the values of “progress,” “innocence,” and the “insti-
tutionalization of knowledge” in scientific and gov-
ernmental bodies were important in framing climate
change in a way that promoted technological “fixes”
and de-emphasized ethical and political choices.
Besides constructing particular images of real-
ity, media discourse also constructs social actors into
particular roles, statuses, or positions. The credibility
that the broadsheet newspapers assigned to claims-
makers, and most prominently to the IPCC, was radi-
cally divergent between the papers and was sustained
over the period. Given that the audiences of the
broadsheet papers are themselves highly segmented
sociodemographically, culturally, and politically, this
analysis suggests that a more nuanced reading of pub-
lic trust in science and scientific institutions, as well as
the social and political power of such institutions, is
necessary.
The article has shown that coverage of cli-
mate change has been strongly linked to the polit-
ical agenda on this issue, and particularly to public
pronouncements and discursive strategies of prime
ministers and other top governmental figures. Fur-
thermore, as noted above, our analysis indicates that
the media build particular images of scientific knowl-
edge and uncertainty on climate change, and empha-
size or de-emphasize forecasts of impacts, in order to
sustain their political preferences regarding the reg-
ulatory role of the state, individual freedom, and the
general economic and social status quo. Dangerous
climate change is thus both politically defined and ide-
ologically constrained.
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